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Abstract
RDDR: N-Versioning of Microservices
by
Riley Jacob Wood, M.S.E.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020
SUPERVISOR: Mohit Tiwari
N-versioning is a well-studied method to increase the reliability of software. In
this paper, we study n-versioning as applied to microservice-based applications. We
construct a generic proxy called RDDR that orchestrates and monitors N variants
of a microservice in order to detect bugs that make them behave dierently. We
showcase RDDR's ability to close ve exemplary information leaks, where diversity is
derived from: dierent software versions, dierent implementations of the same logical
service, and variation provided by the OS like ASLR. These case studies feature
information leakage through both frontend and backend interfaces of various web
applications. To show that RDDR can close vulnerabilities while handling large
volumes of benign trac, we also apply RDDR to components of GitLab, a complex
cloud application. Finally, we quantify the performance overhead associated with
deploying RDDR. Our ndings indicate that RDDR can patch information leaks
while incurring approximately 3x CPU and memory overhead for a deployment with
3 redundant instances as expected, with modest impact to throughput and latency.
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In the pursuit of reliable software, researchers have developed entire elds of
study based on increasing reliability via replication and diversication of applica-
tions. These systems are studied in various forms in several research communities,
including moving target defense (MTD), service-oriented architectures (SOA), and
n-versioned systems. For clarity, we will refer to any system where software is repli-
cated, diversied, and checked for consistency as an n-versioned system. N-versioned
systems rely on diversity to catch vulnerabilities in computer systems. This diversity
largely takes two forms:
1. Code diversity, via multi-programming or compiler-created variants (such as
[2]).
2. System diversity, via architecture or operating system diversity.
We bring a practical implementation of n-versioning defense to distributed
cloud applications with our system, RDDR. RDDR is an acronym that abbreviates
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what our system does: Replicate a request to N variants of a microservice, De-noise
non-deterministic behavior, Di to nd any dierences in the instances' responses,
and Respond with the appropriate reply. RDDR allows one to easily implement an
n-versioned system for large-scale platforms that already use containers and container
orchestration frameworks like Kubernetes [3]. See Figure 1.1 for an illustration of how
RDDR can reduce the attack surface.
We avoid the need for manually generated diversity (such as prior work in
multi-programming) by leveraging the fact that cloud microservices often follow a
pattern of agile development and rapid deployment. We can derive diversity in part
by deploying dierent releases of the same codebase. In this way, RDDR facilitates
safer software upgrades. Consider a piece of software with an information leak vul-
nerability. Typically, a bugx would be written, and the updated application would
replace the previous version in production. Prior studies have shown that updates
frequently cause further regressions [4,5]. With RDDR in place, both the patched and
unpatched versions can be run in parallel and any bugs introduced by the patched
version would be caught. This is because the behavior of the two application ver-
sions will constantly be compared to one another by RDDR. If either one's behavior
diverges (either because the known information leak has been exploited, or a new
one introduced by the patch has been triggered), RDDR will abort the connection
and prevent the leaked information from reaching the attacker. In addition, we can
n-version applications that use the same API but have dierent implementations (e.g.
the PostgreSQL and CockroachDB databases). Software that share only an API and
little in the way of source code should intuitively have highly disjoint attack surfaces.
RDDR leverages this for increased robustness of the overall system.
Cloud applications these days often employ a distributed architecture com-
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Figure 1.1: Above are two microservices A and B, with vulnerabilities indicated as
holes in their attack surfaces. By deploying both microservices as an n-versioned
set with RDDR, the attack surface is reduced to the set of vulnerabilities which are
shared between the two, or in other words, where the holes in their attack surface
overlap.
posed of many microservices. The design philosophy of such systems is to compose
an application from simple services that work in unison to perform a complex func-
tion. GitLab is a real world example of an application designed according to this
paradigm [6]. By distributing application functionality among a number of services,
developers tend to achieve greater system robustness and scalability. Distributed ap-
plications are well-suited to n-versioning with RDDR, since developers can n-version
just those microservices that are deemed critical to the operation of the overall system,
thereby minimizing overhead. In a classic n-version system, this would be comparable
to n-versioning critical segments of the codebase, as opposed to the entire applica-
tion. To the best of our knowledge, this is not an application area where n-versioning
has been practically applied. Prior work has explored methods of determining which
services are most critical, for example: [79].
Although beyond the scope of this paper, RDDR could potentially be used to
diversify instances of a microservice at the hardware level as well. Kubernetes can
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orchestrate a deployment across multiple physically-diverse machines. The diversity
of the system could stem from, for example, the ISA (x86, ARM, MIPS, etc.) or the
chip manufacturer (Intel, AMD, Snapdragon, etc.). This use case is advantageous for
a threat model where the hardware is the source of the vulnerability, as opposed to
the software.
The remainder of this paper is formatted as follows: we begin by presenting
the motivation for n-versioned systems in the cloud in Section 1.2. We then explore
related work in Section 1.3 and describe how the lessons learned from these works
contribute to the implementation of RDDR. A discussion of our system's design is
documented in Section 2.1. Following RDDR's design, we evaluate both conceptual
and real world use cases of RDDR in Section 3.1. We then nish with a discussion
of RDDR in Section 3.2, our concluding remarks in Section 4.1, and a look at future
work in Section 4.2.
1.2 Motivation
1.2.1 The Applicability of N-versioning to OWASP's Top 10
Web App Vulnerabilities
In this section, we study the most common vulnerabilities plaguing web appli-
cations today and investigate whether n-versioning can be applied to defend against
each type of exploit. The types of vulnerabilities studied here are pulled directly from




Injection involves an attacker injecting a procedure they control into the appli-
cation and getting the application to execute it. This can be a crafted query, malicious
server-side scripts, shell code injected in the stack, et cetera. Here we discuss ways
in which each form of injection could be mitigated with n-versioning.
SQL injection: In this form of injection, an attacker is able to inject arbitrary
SQL statements via an input form that the server will mistakenly execute on their
behalf. This can be used to read and write privileged information, or corrupt the
persistent storage of the application.
Usually, web applications feature some sort of sanitizer which treats user input
so that it is not recognized as syntactic SQL. Some sanitizers can be thwarted, and
presumably dierent sanitizers present dierent weaknesses. In theory, developers
could n-version the SQL sanitizer used across N instances. An SQL injection may get
past one, but not all, and this will lead to dierences in behavior across the instances
which an n-versioning monitor can detect and stop.
Another strategy involves replicating the database and microservices that use
it and varying the names of the tables accessed by each microservice instance. A
banking microservice might be interested in querying a table of credit cards, so it
would look up the name of the credit card table in a mapping for that instance
and nd that the table name for this instance is creditcards-89fds2. A dierent
instance's table would be named creditcards-n25k9. Essentially, the developer
adds a level of indirection in the naming of tables. This should thwart many SQL
injections, since the table name, injected by name by the attacker, will not be correct
in every instance. One could implement this by rst writing a script that appends a
random string to every table in a database, and records the mapping from previous
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name to new name in a le. One would then would then subclass the application's
SQL client. The subclass would transparently map the table names in the user's
query to the actual name of the table using the mapping we generated. This means
no application code needs to change outside of instantiating the subclassed client.
Finally, one can also insert honey pot elds in the database tables that, if
leaked, the n-versioning monitor will catch. These elds will be deliberately lled
with random data that dier across instances. When an attacker goes to leak from
the table, they are likely to carelessly dump all columns. The n-versioning monitor
will see the honey pot columns dier across all instances and will detect the attack.
This relies on SQL injections usually being catch-all SELECT queries that aim to
leak whatever they can. The application will never read these elds during normal
operation.
In our evaluation of RDDR in Section 3.1, we demonstrate a proof of concept
n-versioned deployment which successfully closes an SQL injection vulnerability.
Code injection: There are still other forms of injection, such as code injec-
tion. A concrete example involves an attacker uploading a malicious PHP script to
a server and getting the server to execute it. If the end result of the code injection
is an information leak, naturally n-versioning is well-suited to prevent it as long as
variants of the server code can be procured which dier in terms of their susceptibil-
ity to the malicious upload. Also see the discussion of the Insecure Deserialization
vulnerability.
Buer Overow Injection: In this attack, a malicious user exploits a buer
overow vulnerability to overwrite the return pointer in the server's stack and execute
arbitrary code, including attacker-controlled code in certain cases. While many web
applications are written in high-level languages that would not be susceptible to
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buer overow, they may depend on lower-level libraries that are. ASLR is typically
used to randomize the address space and make the exploit more dicult, yet it can
be thwarted if a pointer is leaked to the attacker, thereby revealing the locations of
various data in memory. In an n-versioned system with ASLR, however, if an attacker
tries to leak a pointer, then the pointer will dier in every instance and the exploit
will be caught. In our evaluation of RDDR, we demonstrate a proof of concept n-
versioned deployment which leverages ASLR for protection against a pointer leak and
buer overow injection.
#2: Broken Authentication
In this class of vulnerabilities, a web application's authentication and session
management contain bugs allowing an attacker to compromise user secrets. For ex-
ample, an attacker may aim to leak password hashes and salts from a database. The
n-version monitor can catch the leak if each instance uses dierent salts to hash each
password. This will be the case by default. When the instances report their salts,
their responses will diverge and the exploit will be caught.
#3: Sensitive Data Exposure
This class of vulnerabilities covers a particular type of information leakage
where sensitive data is transmitted in an unencrypted format and can be intercepted.
This represents a conguration issue where data is leaked at all times during normal
operation, as opposed to a bug where data is leaked due to a crafted exploit. The best
mitigation is to properly protect data transmitted via every channel. Importantly,
it's not enough to just encrypt the data in the database where it is stored, since it
may be unencrypted when read out and sent elsewhere. This type of information
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leakage is more dicult for an n-versioning system to protect against, since the leak
is due not to a bug present in only a subset of variants, but to a conguration and/or
application logic issue that would aect either all or none of the variants. Consider
copies of a database deployed as an n-versioned set. The n-version monitor could
catch the leak if a strict subset of the databases return the data unencrypted while
the rest return the data encrypted, but it could not protect against the common mode
failure where all return the data unencrypted.
If developers take care to architect their system such that trust is conned
to one or a small number of microservices, then the trusted service(s) can be con-
gured to properly encrypt data and then be n-versioned. In this case, any leaks of
unencrypted data would be an anomaly that would be detected by an n-versioning
monitor. In [11], Xia et al. present a similar architecture in the mobile domain, where
trust is o-loaded to a security-oriented hardware unit called TinMan. They show
that their system is eective at mitigating sensitive data exposure. Dynamic infor-
mation ow tracking techniques could also be used to track the ow of unencrypted
sensitive data through a distributed application.
#4: XML External Entities
This vulnerability is similar to an injection, but specically aects XML parsers.
The XML standard allows inclusion of external content in the XML document. An
attacker can take advantage of this feature of XML to leak resources accessible to the
server application, e.g. sensitive system les, available ports, or inuence control ow
e.g. execute remote code, or carry out a denial-of-service attack.
Essentially, external entities include content from other URLs into the XML
document. This can trick the server into making a request to an arbitrary attacker-
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provided URL. This can be used to probe the instance's view of the network, read
sensitive les from the instance (using the file:// protocol), etc.
We propose some defenses that use n-versioning to protect against leaking
system les. System administrators can inject whitespace characters (or other unin-
terpreted characters) into system conguration les in each instance container that
an attacker may try to leak. Functionally, these cong les remain the same, but
if they are printed out, the instances' trac will dier and the leak will be caught.
Additionally, administrators can randomize the port mapping in each instance con-
tainer so that port scans will cause divergent behavior. Lastly, administrators can add
randomly-generated user accounts to each container instance such that if /etc/passwd
is ever leaked, behavior will diverge.
#5: Broken Access Control
This class of vulnerabilities involves an application failing to restrict a user's
permissions to the intended set. As a result, an attacker may be granted access to
resources which should be denied. The defense described above, where we vary the
system cong les in each instance, is also applicable here. If a sensitive le is not
locked down as it should be, we can still detect whether it has been read by varying
it across instances. In our evaluation of RDDR, we demonstrate two proof of concept
n-versioned deployments which successfully close broken access control vulnerabilities
in PostgreSQL.
#6: Security Misconguration
The authors cite this as the most common vulnerability. It is hard to prescribe
a one-size-ts-all security policy to all developers since the policy usually depends on
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the particular system topology. That said, one of RDDR's strengths is its ability to
enable n-versioning regardless of system topology and detect a broad set of informa-
tion leak vulnerabilities. With these properties, our system can provide enhanced
security for a broad class of applications.
The authors also mention that verbose error messages can inadvertently leak
info about the system that attackers can use for reconaissance. N-versioning can be
applied to detect uncaught exceptions. Suppose instances of an n-versioned deploy-
ment are assigned a unique ID number. If this ID number were injected into every
unhandled exception message (e.g. in a Python application), then instance behavior
will diverge every time an unhandled exception is reached, which the n-versioning
monitor can prevent from leaking.
#7: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
This is a client-side vulnerability where a malicious script is served to the user
and executed by their browser. At this time, we are only considering n-versioned
deployments on the server-side, so we consider this set of vulnerabilities out of scope.
#8: Insecure Deserialization
When an application suers from this vulnerability, attacker-provided input is
able to inuence the server's state or control ow. An example is the billion laughs
attack in which an untrusted input le is parsed leading to a denial of service [12].
In other cases, the attacker may be able to inject falsied data into a database, or
trigger execution of gadgets in the server's application binary.
On the subject of denial of service attacks, if an attacker supplies an untrusted,
malicious input le and the application parses it immediately, there is little oppor-
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tunity to abort the attack using n-versioning. If the attack is successful and requires
just one request, there will be no response from the N variants since they will have
crashed upon processing the request. Were we to inspect application state across the
N variants as well, it is challenging to deliberately cause variance when the exploit
is underway. N-versioning alone is unable to patch denial of service attacks. How-
ever, prior work from Jones et al. has explored defeating denial-of-service attacks in
n-versioned systems and could be extended to our system in the future [13].
On the other hand, n-versioning can be eective against data injection and
control ow modication. If in an n-versioned deployment only a subset of instances
are vulnerable to data injection, then n-versioning will be able to detect a dierence
in the trac being sent to backend storage; some instances will send the data injected
by the attacker, whereas the rest will not. Furthermore, if the vulnerability instead
makes a subset of instances subject to control ow modication by the attacker,
depending on the specic application the instances may behave dierently in terms of
the trac they send back to the attacker. The n-versioning monitor will again catch
this dierence and abort the attack.
#9: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
In this vulnerability, developers expose themselves to exploitation by not
patching known vulnerabilities in components of their system. To mitigate this with
n-versioning, developers can deploy multiple instances of a component, each a dierent
version. It's worth mentioning that this is a less deliberate method of varying your
instances. That is, you are not guaranteed that instances' behavior will diverge in the
presence of an attack. This is because the instances may all share the vulnerability
and the exploit will continue to succeed because of common mode failure.
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Also, components may exhibit vulnerabilities that wouldn't normally aect
application-level software written for the cloud. For example, most web apps aren't
vulnerable to buer overows by virtue of being written in safer languages. But they
may depend on a library written in C that does have a buer overow vulnerability. If
this is the case, variation via ASLR can also be useful for this class of vulnerabilities.
#10: Insucient Logging and Monitoring
Insucient monitoring of the system can make it dicult to know when an
attack is underway or how one may have been carried out. N-versioning can be used to
detect the occurrence of an attack and trigger verbose logging. N-versioning can also
provide insight into the exact combination of inputs that led to divergent behavior.
Conclusion
In summary, n-versioning has the potential to protect against most entries in
the OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities list. We note that it is less applicable to Insuf-
cient Logging and Monitoring, DoS attacks discussed in Insecure Deserialization,
and Cross-Site Scripting. Ultimately, n-versioning's strength in this domain is in
detecting behavioral anomalies among a set of microservice instances. This can be
a dierence in state, I/O, timing, etc. which could all be symptoms of any of the
remaining categories of vulnerabilities discussed here.
1.2.2 Scenarios Where N-Versioning Can Be Benecial to Cloud
There are many hypothetical web app deployments where n-versioning can
pose a real benet. Consider the following hypothetical scenario. A bug is discovered
in a web application in production, and the development team sets o to quickly
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release a patch for the vulnerability. However, in their rush to get the x out, the
developers introduce a new bug. Prior studies show that all too often software updates
in fact lead to more bugs. A study by Crameri et al. investigated the hurdles to
deploying updates in real systems [5]. The system administrators they surveyed
reported that bugs in updates are one of the most common reasons why software
updates fail. In another publication, Yin et al. found that between 14.8% and 24.4%
of the OS updates they studied were implemented incorrectly [4]. RDDR can mitigate
new vulnerabilities introduced in the latest releases of software. Simply deploy the
current version and patched version alongside one another behind our proxy, and the
system will be resilient both to the known vulnerability and to any new vulnerabilities
that may have been introduced by the patch. Prior work by Hosek et al. studied
an equivalent deployment strategy and found it to be eective at mitigating new
bugs [14].
In another scenario, developers are unaware of any specic vulnerabilities that
may plague their system that need to be patched, but they want assurance that their
attack surface has been proactively minimized. By deploying multiple implementa-
tions of the same function alongside one another behind our proxy, the developers can
be assured that their system is only vulnerable to the information leaks common to
both implementations. There are a number of application types where diverse imple-
mentations are available. For SSH, there is OpenSSH and Dropbear; for databases,
there is PostgreSQL, CockroachDB, and EnterpriseDB; for in-memory storage, there
is Redis and memcached; for TCP/IP proxies, there is Nginx and Envoy; etc.
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1.3 Related Work
Work related to RDDR touches various areas of computing including: Service
Oriented Architectures, n-versioning, and moving target defense systems. There are
many overlapping ideas and terms these paradigms share, however they are discrete
enough to be logically separated when presented in relation to RDDR. RDDR borrows
concepts from each area to create a system that can run in real time in a containerized
environment via Docker.
The aim of these computation models varies depending on the research com-
munity that developed them. The SOA community typically focuses on improving
quality of service (e.g. [1517]). The n-versioning and MTD communities aims to
mitigate vulnerabilities and improve software robustness (e.g. [1820] for n-versioning
and [8,21,22] for MTD). They each employ diversity in dierent ways to achieve these
goals. We share their aim of mitigating vulnerabilities via diversity, though our ap-
proach to diversication is more similar to n-versioning. We borrow from the SOA
community the distributed system architecture.
1.3.1 SOA
Service-oriented architectures (SOAs) have a long, rich history and distributed
applications composed of microservices fall under the umbrella of SOAs. Many SOAs
have proposed theoretical models which leverage containerization for redundancy and
diversity. For example, in [17] Gorbenko et al. describe a system similar to RDDR's
front-end proxy, which they dub reliable concurrent execution. However, their sys-
tem remains a theoretical model rather than a practical implementation like RDDR.
In the course of implementing RDDR, we were forced to cope with many non-idealities
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exhibited by real-world applications. These are described further in Section 2.1.2 on
RDDR's design.
Diy is a tool similar in design to RDDR, created by Twitter, used to perform
regression testing in their SOA by running two versions of a single microservice (old
and new) side by side [23]. This system was not developed to be run in production and
was primarily developed to nd bugs in Apache Thrift and HTTP-based services.
Diy inspired the design of RDDR's incoming proxy, but RDDR builds on Diy in
several ways which enable it to be seamlessly integrated into distributed application
architectures. Diy only replicates trac to the microservice replicas; it does not
merge requests the replicas may make to downstream microservices. Were you to try
to integrate Diy into a production application, you would need to replicate every
microservice downstream from Diy. RDDR's outgoing proxy, on the other hand, is
able to merge trac streams, obviating the need to replicate any downstream services.
Diy also inspired RDDR's non-deterministic noise lter. That said, Diy is unable to
gracefully handle ephemeral state like CSRF tokens which it would naively lter out as
non-deterministic noise. This makes Diy unsuitable for many real-world applications
which rely on CSRF tokens for security. In contrast, RDDR automatically identies,
saves, and later restores ephemeral state output by a microservice. These design
decisions are explained at length in Section 2.1.2.
1.3.2 N-versioning
Work on n-versioning goes back decades and revolves around the idea of having
multiple copies of a program/system (usually diverse) running in parallel to improve
security. Early examples include redundant ight systems in aviation. N-versioning
systems typically vote on responses generated by the dierent versions, with a ma-
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jority rules schema.
In [18], Gholami et al. use n-versioning to reduce server load and improve
performance of the distributed application. They vary service instances in terms of
the number of features they oer. More lightweight instances can handle requests
that don't require the full feature set. This is more ecient than scaling out the same
service in equal numbers. Their architecture is similar to ours, but with a dierent
goal in mind. Whereas they aim to increase eciency of the deployment by varying
the featureset, we aim to increase robustness by varying the vulnerability set.
Otterstad et al. describe in [19] the benets of deploying diverse microser-
vices behind a controller. Their system resembles RDDR insofar as they propose
n-versioning microservices and blocking responses on divergence. They even men-
tion how you could use the system like a honeypot, which we discussed earlier in
Section 1.2.1. However, their proposal is merely a theoretical model rather than a
practical implementation like RDDR. Like the work by Gorbenko et al. [17], they fall
short of addressing the non-idealities of real-world applications.
1.3.3 MTD
MTD systems utilize diversity, however they typically vary applications over
time rather than run diverse variants concurrently, like n-versioned systems. Prior
works such as [8,21,22] apply MTD to distributed server applications. Torkura et al.
use diversity over time in [8] to randomize the attack surface of cloud applications
over time. They take a data-driven approach to diversifying microservices in order
to mitigate high-risk vulnerabilities rst. They do this by aggregating the known
vulnerabilities a microservice is susceptible to and comparing their CVSS scores [24]
and OWASP ratings [25].
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In [22], Azab et al. present ESCAPE, wherein Linux containers are migrated
from host to host on-demand to evade attackers. A monitor looks for anomalous be-
havior from the containers, which is assumed to indicate an attack underway, and will
initiate a migration on sight. Their evaluation consists of a simulation of a represen-
tative mathematical model, but the system proposed is never actually implemented.
1.3.4 N-versioning and MTD in Other Domains
So far, we have discussed related work in the same domain as RDDR: dis-
tributed cloud applications. However, these elds have a broad reach, touching a
number of other domains from operating systems to software-dened networking.
In [20], Österlund et al. use n-versioning (also known as multi-variant execu-
tion) to improve robustness of the Linux kernel. Like us, the authors aim to protect
against information leaks by deploying two diverse kernels in parallel. They rely on
a variant generator to manually create variance among the kernels so as to cause di-
vergence on information leaks. Contrast this with systems where diversity is derived
more organically, such as by multiple teams implementing the same specication in
isolation [2628]. For our evaluation, we study deployments of RDDR where diversity
is sourced organically from dierent versions and implementations of software, and
automatically from the OS.
Software-dened networking has been used to implement moving target defense
in [29]. The authors argue that a variable software-dened network is a natural t for
moving target defense where the computing environment, namely the network in this
case, is constantly adapting to attackers' strategies. They report success in delaying
an attacker's discovery of critical network services, i.e. the reconaissance phase of an
attack.
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1.3.5 Currently Available Technology
Production-level proxies like Envoy [30] and Nginx [31] oer a feature called
trac shadowing, which is comparable to RDDR, but falls short of RDDR's level
of protection against attacks. In trac shadowing, the trac to a microservice
in production can be replicated and forwarded to a shadow copy. This can help
developers regression test updates in development with real-world trac prior to
deploying them. While this technique can help to discover vulnerabilities, it doesn't
add any protection to the production microservice. The proxy will ignore all trac
returned by the shadowed instance rather than derive useful information from it. N-
versioning with RDDR, on the other hand, actually sits on the critical path of trac
and has the potential to shrink your deployment's attack surface because the shadow
instance's trac is actively monitored for consistency with the other instance(s). On
top of monitoring trac, RDDR provides features that are necessary when deployed
in real-world applications that exhibit random noise and instance-specic state, which
a shadow proxy could not handle by itself.
And RDDR is not just a shadow proxy with trac dierencing; it also provides
features which are necessary for use with real-world applications that exhibit random





In Section 1.2, we detailed numerous scenarios where n-versioning could be
deployed to address the most common vulnerabilities in cloud applications. We then
discussed recent work on n-versioning and similar systems in Section 1.3. In that
section, we highlighted certain theoretical models of n-versioning applied to cloud
platforms ( [18, 19]). In this section, we present the design of our system, RDDR. It
builds on the models presented in prior work and makes several contributions which
are crucial for practical deployments on real-world applications.
2.1.1 Threat Model
RDDR aims to make distributed applications more resilient to remote attacks.
The attacker aims to leak data from the distributed application by leveraging one or
more vulnerabilities in the application's constituent microservices. It is assumed that
the data will be leaked through one of the microservice endpoints, rather than through
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Figure 2.1: RDDR block diagram.
against side channel leakage, we defer to these prior works: [4042]. If the information
leak can be automatically detected and prevented, even if this means returning no
data to the attacker, we consider the vulnerability mitigated. The attacker is assumed
to be unprivileged in the context of host system administration and in the context of
the web application.
2.1.2 System Design
Our system is called RDDR, which stands for Replicate, De-noise, Di, and
Respond. These are the main steps our system takes in order to detect divergent
behavior. First, critical microservices are replicated and diversied across several
instances. Incoming trac is then replicated and sent to each instance. The in-
stances send their responses. RDDR dis the responses to detect divergent behavior,
and if none is detected, it will respond to the client. This is a high-level description
of how the system works. Later on, we will describe subtleties of our system such as
how we handle non-deterministic noise and ephemeral state.
As stated in Section 1.1, RDDR helps to achieve application robustness with
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lower overhead by exploiting the distributed nature of cloud applications. Developers
need only create copies of critical microservices and manage them using RDDR rather
than make copies of the entire application, which would be more costly. Furthermore,
modern container orchestration tools like Kubernetes [3] and Docker Swarm [43] sim-
plify the process of replicating your microservice from a base image. All of this
pre-existing infrastructure, and the fact that RDDR itself can be run as a container
using a Docker image, make RDDR straightforward to deploy.
RDDR is written in Python 3 with support from the asyncio event loop library.
The source code is freely available online under the MIT License [44]. Architecturally,
RDDR can be visualized as a set of proxies on either side of the N variants of the
critical application. Both of these proxies operate at the transport/socket layer.
Each proxy binds to an IP and one or more ports and waits for incoming connections.
Depending on the type of proxy, incoming data will be processed dierently before
being forwarded to the next endpoint.
One proxy is deployed to handle incoming requests to the variants. This
is the RDDR Incoming Proxy shown in Figure 2.1. It will replicate and make
any necessary modications to trac coming into the proxy and then forward the
trac to all variants. Modications made to inbound trac are described further
in Section 2.1.2. The Incoming Proxy will compare any trac sent by the variants
in response to check for divergent behavior. The trac is tokenized and dierenced
according to the messaging protocol. If any meaningful dierences are seen, excluding
non-deterministic noise, the proxy will close the connection to the client and forward
them none of the data. Aborting communication like this helps to avoid information
leaks experienced by only a subset of the instances. See Section 2.1.2 for more on
how non-deterministic noise is allowed to propagate through the proxy.
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Deployed behind the application variants, there may be zero or more of the
RDDR Outgoing Proxy as seen in Figure 2.1. This proxy performs a similar
function to the Incoming Proxy, but it monitors trac between the microservice
variants and one other microservice in the backend. This enables catching information
leaks that may occur on a network connection other than the one that is directly
client-facing, which the Incoming Proxy handles. The Outgoing Proxy's functionality
is a mirror image of the Incoming Proxy, in that it dierences messaging coming
from the N variants, rather than messages going to them. Additionally, it modies
and replicates the response to their query. Lastly, the Outgoing Proxy allows non-
deterministic noise through just like the Incoming Proxy. The Outgoing Proxy diers
from the Incoming Proxy in that it exposes a dierent port for each of the microservice
variants to connect to. Each of the variants is expected to connect to a specic port
on the Outgoing proxy so that the proxy can distinguish which trac was sent by
which variant. Both the Incoming and Outgoing Proxies are started from the same
binary and share a container.
Protocol Support
RDDR supports various transport and application layer protocols. Presently,
it supports unencrypted TCP as well as encrypted SSL at the transport layer. It
also ships with support for some application layer protocols including PostgreSQL,
HTTP, and JSON. Support for application layer protocols is implemented by separate
Python modules with a standardized interface, allowing developers to extend RDDR
to support new protocols as desired. These modules handle all protocol-specic tasks
such as tokenizing, dierencing trac, and modifying trac. Additionally, a generic
bytewise dierencing module is provided for strict, general purpose monitoring.
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The application protocol modules tokenize and dierence the trac according
to the semantics of the protocol. For example, the HTTP module tokenizes at the
newline boundary and dis lines against one another. The HTTP module will also
interpret the HTTP header and decompress the message before ding if necessary,
as well as save CSRF tokens; more on this later. The PostgreSQL module tokenizes
the trac into separate messages according to the PostgreSQL message format [45]
and will di messages of types deemed critical.
Handling Nondeterminism
In Section 1.3, we discuss some of the related work on theoretical models
for n-versioning in the cloud. These models share some aspects of our design, but
lack others. One feature lacking from these models, but sorely needed for practical
implementation, is how to distinguish random noise from real divergent behavior.
Suppose that the N microservice instances send a random string to the client.
A real-world example is PHP session IDs, which web applications use to uniquely
identify users. Because each instance generates a dierent random string, their trac
will appear divergent even in the absence of a bug. To distinguish random noise from
real bugs, we have implemented ltering similar to Diy's approach [23]. For n-version
deployments that exhibit some random noise, one can deploy two instances of the same
microservice (no diversity applied) and use them in combination to determine which
divergences are random and which are due to the diversity. RDDR is programmed
to lter based on the trac received from these two instances which comprise the
so-called lter pair. In the case of generating random strings, even the two identical
instances will dier in the string they produce. We know that these instances are
identical and thus, this particular divergence cannot be due to any bug present in the
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application. With ltering turned on, RDDR will only categorize trac divergence
as a bug if all instances except the lter pair dier from one another.
We emphasize that the lter pair must behave dierently from one another
in every instance of non-deterministic behavior. Therefore, developers will want to
make sure that they are using a cryptographically-secure source of randomness to
avoid duplicate values. Similarly, developers should take care when reducing the
entropy of a random variable, for example by choosing a random integer from a small
range where the probability of duplicate values is higher.
Handling Ephemeral State
Another feature lacking from theoretical models but required for real deploy-
ments is a mechanism to accomodate ephemeral microservice state used in client-
server handshakes. Consider the case of CSRF tokens. These are randomly gen-
erated strings which the server embeds in HTML forms requested by clients. The
server stores these tokens and checks to make sure that each request submitted has
a valid token, i.e. that it corresponds to a real form that was previously requested.
This mitigates cross-site request forgery (CSRF), where a user may be tricked into
submitting POST data to the server by means other than the ocial HTML form,
such as by clicking a malicious link. If CSRF tokens are used by a microservice that
is n-versioned using a more naive system, the tokens will appear to the n-version
monitor as non-deterministic noise and be ltered as previously described. The mon-
itor would then forward one of these tokens on to the client as part of the HTML
form. However, a problem arises when the user subsequently submits the form with
the token embedded in it. The user's token is valid for only one of the N instances,
yet it will be replicated to all. Therefore, only one instance will properly handle the
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user's request; the others will reject their token and the monitor will think it has seen
a bug when comparing their responses. To remedy this, RDDR may make minimal
modications to the trac being sent to the N instances so that each receives the
correct token.
To do this, RDDR's HTTP handler plugin actually stores values it suspects
are CSRF tokens and reinserts them later. As the plugin scans the trac being sent
to the client, it will not only ignore lines that dier across all instances. Within that
line, it will look for the character ranges that dier, and if all are alphanumeric and
at least ten characters, the plugin will save those strings. The criteria for saving
alphanumeric and at least ten charactersis fairly arbitrary and seemed to work in
practice with our CSRF tokens. The plugin remembers which CSRF token was sent
to the client, and which CSRF token each microservice instance expects to see later.
When the plugin observes the user's CSRF token in a later request, it will substitute
his or her token with the one appropriate for each microservice before sending it
along. After forwarding, the set of CSRF tokens can be removed from memory.
As of now, the HTTP extension is the only one which stores tokens in this
fashion. However, the ability to modify trac is included in the standard plugin API,
so any developer is free to implement a similar solution should their protocol require
it.
Handling Known Variance
Some application variants will inevitably behave dierently. Consider dierent
versions of the same application deployed behind RDDR of which you can request
the software version. Upon requesting the version, RDDR is likely to identify deter-
ministic divergence, since the version string depends directly on the version of the
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program. To mitigate this phenomenon, you can statically congure RDDR to ignore
foreseen divergence. This is currently only implemented for the Postgres plugin but
could be extended to others.
2.1.3 Acquiring Program Variants
Because RDDR requires unanimous agreement among the microservice vari-
ants for a response to go through, the information leak attack surface of the system
eectively becomes the intersection of the attack surfaces of all instances. Therefore,
RDDR is only able to shrink a system's attack surface if the constituent microservice
instances are diverse. There is an additional requirement that though instances are
diverse, they behave the same way with regard to some specication. This enables
RDDR to pass along trac adhering to that spec, which will be the same across all
instances. For example, SSH servers from dierent developers are expected to both
adhere to the SSH protocol. There are a number of ways developers can achieve
diversity among the N variants they deploy, and we discuss some techniques here.
Developers may deploy diverse implementations of a particular microser-
vice function from dierent vendors. When we say function, we mean a logical compo-
nent of a system such as a database or proxy that performs a well-specied function.
Databases like PostgreSQL, for example, implement a well-specied query language
and network protocol. Other database technologies exist which conform to the same
query language and protocol, like CockroachDB [46] and EnterpriseDB [47]. Because
these three applications adhere to the same network protocol and ought to behave the
same given the same inputs, it is straightforward to deploy them as diverse instances
of the same logical database.
A dierent technique involves deploying dierent versions of an application
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from a shared codebase. This technique can be helpful in closing vulnerabilities in an
old version of the microservice while simultaneously preventing exploitation of new
bugs introduced by a software update. An important stipulation is that these versions
should share at least the set of features that are required to implement the overall
application. This technique was explored by Hosek et al. in [14], who found that
new vulnerabilities introduced by software updates could be successfully mitigated
by deploying alongside older versions.
There are also automated ways of generating diversity that don't incur soft-
ware development overhead. One way is to leverage the operating system. The OS
can diversify software at the process level by randomizing the address space, inserting
randomized stack guards, and using disjoint code layouts. Prior works such as [4850]
have explored n-versioning implementations relying on these techniques. Developers
can also leverage tools like the compiler to introduce diversity. [51] provides a useful
overview of state-of-the-art techniques for automating software diversity, including
mutating and reordering basic blocks, randomizing the stack layout, and inserting
garbage code, among many other techniques. [52] leverages compiler-based diversi-
cation to increase software robustness to transient hardware errors. AVATARs, a
project from NEC Laboratories, uses a combination of diverse compilers and source-
to-source translators to yield diverse executables from a single codebase [53].
2.1.4 Limitations
Our solution potentially makes the system more vulnerable to denial-of-service
attacks. Consider the case where we have 3 dierent versions of an app deployed, and
one of them has a vulnerability that can cause runaway CPU utilization and thus
denial of service. The n-versioned system will still be vulnerable to denial of service
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since the buggy app will receive the malicious input and begin hogging resources.
While out of scope for this paper, denial of service could be mitigated by augmenting
RDDR with a timeout counter. If an instance takes longer than the timeout to
respond, it will be restarted. We refer to [13] for ways to combat an attacker who
repeatedly triggers a denial of service in an n-versioned system.
Our system potentially broadens the timing attack surface. Consider appli-
cation A deployed alongside application B. A contains no timing bugs, whereas B
contains one timing bug that can leak sensitive information: B will take longer to
respond to a login request with a valid username than one with an invalid username.
If A and B are deployed side by side and RDDR waits for them both to respond,
the timing channel in B is still exploitable. Prior work from Yin et al. explores
how to protect against attackers exploiting the weakest instance in an n-versioned
deployment to learn information via a side channel [54].
N-versioning would not be applicable for services that generate instance-specic
secrets, such as multi-factor authentication. This is OK; you would simply factor out
the multi-factor auth service into its own service. Multi-factor auth is not likely to be
very vulnerable since it does not directly receive user input. If an application were to
generate secrets which owed (directly or indirectly) to the client, then the de-noising
step of our system would eliminate the possibility of a false positive.
We do not consider vulnerabilities that may exist in the RDDR proxies them-
selves. It is possible our software is imperfect and introduces new bugs. Our software
would need to be subject to testing and scrutiny for developers to feel comfortable
deploying it. We have decided to open source the project in part to encourage com-
munity members to audit the codebase.
There is the possibility that RDDR may register a false positive if microser-
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vices contain time-varying information in their outputs. Consider a microservice that
reports a coarse-grained timestamp. If a request is made on a time boundary to
a 2-version deployment with non-deterministic ltering, there is a chance that the
lter pair both report time as 12:10, whereas the third instance reports the time
as 12:11. RDDR would detect divergent behavior and block the response, a false
alarm. In our deployments, however, we have found this not to be an issue.
Some forms of ephemeral state will not be able to be reinserted by RDDR.
Consider the case where the application issues a challenge to the user which diers
from one instance to the next. The user is expected to process the challenge string
in some way (perhaps by signing it with a private key) and return the result to the
application. RDDR will save the various challenges from each application instance,
but because the user modies it on their end, RDDR will be incapable of inserting
the appropriate response to each instance. To remedy this, we recommend leveraging
the microservice architecture and factoring out the generation of the challenge string
into a separate, single microservice. All application instances will make an outgoing
request through the Outgoing Proxy to this microservice and as a result, they will all





First we will apply RDDR in a number of dierent deployments and study the
vulnerabilities it is able to close. All deployments were carried out on real hardware,
and the Kubernetes les implementing each deployment are available in the RDDR
source code repository. By showing that RDDR patches known vulnerabilities, it is
reasonable to extrapolate that RDDR should also be able to patch similar, undis-
covered vulnerabilities in the future. We will demonstrate diversifying instances of a
microservice by varying: the version, the implementation, and the address space of
that microservice. After analyzing some small-scale case studies, we will demonstrate
RDDR deployed within GitLab, a large-scale distributed application which already
employs many industry best practices for security. We conclude by measuring the
overhead incurred by n-versioning with RDDR.
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3.1.1 Case Study: SQL Injection
The Damn Vulnerable Web App (DVWA) is a website that demoes many
commonplace web vulnerabilities [55]. It was developed to help system admins and
web developers hone their understanding of web security. DVWA can be congured
for dierent security levels to make the job of exploiting vulnerabilities more and more
dicult. One such vulnerability is SQL injection. In an SQL injection, an attacker
is able to modify the function of a benign query in order to perform a malicious
exploit. Often this is accomplished by escaping the quotation marks where user input
is placed, causing the user input to be interpreted as actual SQL syntax. This enables
attackers to read the contents of privileged tables and even make modications to the
database. Query sanitization is the rst line of defense against SQL injection. By
sanitizing the query, the application can detect and prevent characters of the user's
input like apostrophes and quotation marks from being interpreted as SQL syntax.
Dierent DVWA security levels will sanitize user input to varying degrees.
With RDDR, we can harden DVWA against SQL injections. We have mod-
ied DVWA slightly so that it uses an external database rather than one built into
the container. From there, we deploy three instances of the DVWA frontend com-
municating with a single backend database through RDDR's outgoing proxy. An
illustration of the deployment topology is shown in Figure 3.1. The DVWA instances
are congured with dierent levels of security so that they sanitize user input dier-
ently. One instance is congured for greater input sanitization, whereas the other two
instances, forming the lter pair, don't do any input sanitization. This should lead to
divergent behavior when an SQL injection is underway which RDDR can detect and
stop. This case study emphasizes the necessity of the outgoing proxy. The outgoing
proxy enables our N instances to communicate with a single backend database and is
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of DVWA deployed with RDDR
instrumental in detecting the divergence in the queries sent to it.
The deployment is successful at preventing SQL injection and letting through
benign trac. When the user requests the SQL Injection demo page, their request is
forwarded by RDDR's incoming proxy to every instance of DVWA's frontend. The
instances each send the webpage, which contains an input form and CSRF token.
As described in Section 2.1.2, RDDR will automatically identify the CSRF tokens
and save them. The user is forwarded the page sent by the rst instance. Consider
an attacker who tries to exploit the form and insert an SQL injection which reads
passwords from the database. The attacker will submit the form as a POST request
back to the cluster. RDDR will replicate the user's request for each instance and
substitute the CSRF token it previously saved with the right token for that instance.
Then it forwards the trac to each instance. To respond to the user's POST request,
each frontend instance must request data from the database to present to the user.
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Figure 3.2: RDDR denying access when divergent behavior is observed
They insert the user input into a query template; the insecure instances do not san-
itize the query, whereas the secure instance does. The instances send their MySQL
queries to RDDR's outgoing proxy. RDDR gathers the requests from every instance
and compares them for equality before merging them and sending one request along
to the actual database. It is here that the outgoing proxy detects the exploit. It will
see that the secure instance has escaped the quotation marks input by the attacker
while the other two instances have not. Upon seeing this divergence, the outgoing
proxy will terminate the socket opened to the frontend instances, and they will sub-
sequently return an HTTP error code. These HTTP error codes happen to also be
agged as divergent by the incoming proxy, which renders the denial message to the
attacker presented in Figure 3.2. When users make benign requests using the form,
no divergence is detected by the outgoing proxy, since no syntactic characters are
inserted by the user.
3.1.2 Case Study: Varying microservice implementation
As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, developers can diversify instances of an appli-
cation by sourcing implementations from dierent development teams. For certain
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applications, there exist a number of vendors oering products that comply with the
same interface. We note that for RDDR to be applicable, all application instances
must implement the same application layer protocol (e.g. HTTP), or else a
translation layer is needed so that all benign trac looks identical to RDDR across all
instances. CockroachDB and PostgreSQL are two databases that use the same net-
work protocol. PostgreSQL was developed rst in 1996 along with its protocol, known
as pgwire. CockroachDB, created at Cockroach Labs and rst released in 2017, was
designed to comply with the PostgreSQL network protocol so as to be compatible
with existing tools and infrastructure. This means the two can be deployed together
behind RDDR without the need for a translation layer. In this case study, we show
that a conguration consisting of two Postgres instances and one CockroachDB in-
stance accepts benign trac and is able to detect and prevent an information leak
vulnerability aecting Postgres.
1 CREATE FUNCTION leak2 ( in t ege r , i n t e g e r ) RETURNS boolean
2 AS $$BEGIN RAISE NOTICE ' l eak % %' , $1 , $2 ;
3 RETURN $1 > $2 ; END$$
4 LANGUAGE p lpg sq l immutable ;
5 CREATE OPERATOR >>> ( procedure=leak2 , l e f t a r g=intege r , r i gh t a r g=
intege r , r e s t r i c t=s c a l a r g t s e l ) ;
6 SET client_min_messages TO ' no t i c e ' ;
7 EXPLAIN (COSTS OFF) SELECT ∗ FROM some_table WHERE col_to_leak
>>> 0 ;
Listing 3.1: Exploit for CVE-2017-7484
The vulnerability we will mitigate is CVE-2017-7484, an information leak in
Postgres up to version 9.2.20 [56]. The vulnerability is due to a bug in how Postgres
enforces access control when doing query planning. An attacker leverages a custom-
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dened function and operator to leak information via a SELECT query. While protected
data won't be leaked in the query results themselves, it is leaked when the database
creates a query plan, which will pass sensitive information to the attacker's custom
operator. To be vulnerable, a protected table must exist within the database. This
is any table that one or more users are unable to read from. An unprivileged user
can use the exploit shown in Listing 3.1 to create a custom operator which leaks this
table during query planning despite it ostensibly being protected.
Key to our n-versioned deployment is the observation that this vulnerability
only aects Postgres, and not CockroachDB. CockroachDB is inherently immune to
this CVE, since it does not support user-dened functions and operators. We should
note that if these features are a necessity for the overall application, this would not be
a suitable deployment. All instances that make up an n-versioned deployment must
share the minimum set of features needed to implement the target application. Oth-
erwise, developers will encounter divergent behavior when one instance executes the
feature and another raises an error. In addition, Postgres and CockroachDB need to
be congured to behave as identically as possible. For example, in our deployment we
had to manually congure Postgres' transaction isolation level. CockroachDB forces
serializable isolation (the strictest setting), so Postgres must do the same. There are
certain cases where the two implementations cannot be made to behave the same,
such as when they report their version strings. CockroachDB will of course report
CockroachDB and its version, whereas Postgres will report something dierent.
Thankfully, RDDR can be pre-congured to ignore any anticipated, benign diver-
gence. For our deployment, we congured RDDR to anticipate the dierent version
strings. Upon seeing the version string for a given instance, RDDR will substitute
it with the same string for every instance before dierencing. This does not change
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the trac received by the end client. We also found that CockroachDB and Postgres
diered in how they ordered rows of query results. Because the PostgreSQL query
language does not guarantee any particular row order unless specied by the ORDER
BY keyword, each implementation is allowed to order rows however it sees t. Natu-
rally, when they dier RDDR blocks the connection, despite the trac being benign.
To avoid the issue, developers would need to explicitly order all queries.
Once the N variants are appropriately congured, CVE-2017-7484 can be mit-
igated. The exploit shown in Listing 3.1 will fail at the very rst step. Whereas
the Postgres instance will indicate successful creation of the custom function, Cock-
roachDB will raise an error indicating that the feature is not supported. RDDR will
identify the dierence in trac and break the connection before either response can
reach the client. The attacker can try to reconnect and proceed with subsequent
steps of the attack, but the nal EXPLAIN query which causes the leak will always be
blocked. The Postgres instances, as we know, are vulnerable to this attack and will in
fact still leak information from the protected table. But CockroachDB, having failed
to create the custom operator and function, will throw an error complaining that the
< operator cannot be parsed. Because RDDR will again identify the dierence in
their responses as divergent behavior indicative of a leak, CockroachDB's behavior
helps to protect PostgreSQL from leaking sensitive information.
This deployment demonstrates the feasibility of deploying very diverse imple-
mentations of the same logical function behind RDDR for reliability. It also illustrates
some of the diculties developers may encounter, such as having to circumvent un-
specied behavior like row order. However, once these issues are sorted out, this kind
of deployment is very powerful. Like any RDDR deployment, this one is only suscep-
tible to information leaks that plague all instances, i.e. common mode failures. Prior
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work from the Project on Diverse Software (PODS) found that common mode failures
in diverse software implementations are rare, and the few that crop up are generally
due to a aw in the specication itself rather than a recurrent bug present in every
codebase [57]. This suggests that an RDDR deployment of diverse implementations
such as PostgreSQL and CockroachDB should be especially resilient to information
leak vulnerabilities.
3.1.3 Case Study: Varying microservice version
In this case study, we explore an n-versioned deployment where diversity is
derived from deploying dierent versions of the same microservice. The application to
be studied is Nginx, a widely used proxy for web applications. A recent vulnerability,
CVE-2017-7529 [32], demonstrated that Nginx up to version 1.13.2 was vulnerable to
an integer overow which could leak sensitive server information. The vulnerability
is due to Nginx processing a content range request incorrectly. The attacker sends an
HTTP request with a crafted Range header. Nginx fails to check the bounds of the
user-supplied range, and experiences integer overow when calculating the size of the
payload to send back. It calculates a size larger than the requested document itself,
and ends up sending data past the end of the document to the client. The result is
a very long response sent back to the client containing the document concatenated
with the contents of server memory.
We are able to patch this vulnerability using RDDR deployed in front of multi-
ple versions of the Nginx proxy. We deploy a 3-version conguration of Nginx, where
the two instances comprising the lter pair are running version 1.13.2, and the third
instance is running 1.13.4 which does not exhibit this vulnerability. This models a
hypothetical deployment strategy where developers deploy old and new versions of
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the same application in parallel behind RDDR in order to patch bugs in the old ver-
sion as well as prevent exploitation of any new bugs that may have been introduced
by the patch. We carry out the exploit against our n-versioned Nginx deployment
and nd that RDDR successfully aborts the connection. It sees that one instance's
response is much longer than the other's which it treats as divergent behavior. With
that, the information leak has been patched.
This case study emphasizes the applicability of RDDR to deployments where
diversity is achieved by deploying dierent versions of the same application. We also
want to emphasize how easy it is to construct an n-versioned deployment this way.
Containerization platforms like Docker have built in support for specifying image
versions by tag, so it is straightforward to spin up the exact versions of a container
that you need.
3.1.4 Case Study: Variance Through ASLR
Buer overows are a common avenue for attackers to begin an exploit. It used
to be that a buer overow could directly enable hijacking control ow by overwriting
the stack's return address with the location of the exploit code. This can be attacker-
controlled code such as shell code injected in the overowed buer itself, or a gadget
that's already present in the application binary and can be used maliciously by the
attacker [5860]. Nowadays, with the widespread adoption of address space layout
randomization (ASLR), buer overow attacks are made more dicult. Because the
operating system varies the virtual address space each time the program is executed,
the attacker no longer knows where their exploit code is located. Before the attacker
can hijack the program, he or she must learn the address of the code to jump to. This
can be done by causing the program to leak a pointer to the section of memory of
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interest.
RDDR can play a useful role in preventing pointer leaks in the presence of
ASLR. We have developed a C program that is vulnerable to a buer overow attack.
The program is a simple echo server that stores the requester's message in a buer and
sends it back. However, the program does not check for overow, so if the requester
overwrites the null terminator at the end of the buer, the program will leak a pointer
adjacent to the buer in the stack. When the program is deployed with ASLR, this
helps the attacker learn the location of a gadget to exploit. An attacker's exploit
would proceed as follows: rst, send a large payload to cause the program to leak
a pointer; second, calculate the address of the gadget as an oset from the leaked
pointer; third, send an even larger payload to overwrite the return address with the
calculated address of the gadget. RDDR is able to stop the exploit at step one by
detecting and preventing the pointer leak. When two instances of the same binary
with ASLR are n-versioned, each will have a unique address space. When the attacker
tries to leak a pointer, each instance will report a dierent address. RDDR will treat
this as divergent behavior and close the connection to the attacker. This deployment
does not use non-deterministic ltering, since RDDR's lter would choose to ignore
the addresses as they would dier across every instance including the lter pair.
3.1.5 N-versioning components of GitLab
Here we apply RDDR to a deployment of GitLab [6], a web-based platform for
hosting and collaborating on source code repositories. We will show that n-versioning
with RDDR need only be applied to a subset of the containers in the deployment to
achieve resilience.
Next we will describe the architecture of GitLab, a distributed cloud applica-
42
Figure 3.3: Simplied view of GitLab architecture, borrowed from [1].
tion which exemplies many best practices in cloud security. We study the microser-
vices that make up the architecture, vulnerabilities associated with those components,
and ways in which n-versioning may provide resilience to those vulnerabilities.
GitLab Architecture
GitLab is a web-based platform enabling individuals and teams to host and
collaborate on source code repositories. It also has facilities for hosting web pages like
project documentation, deploying continuous integration pipelines, collecting project
analytics, and tracking bugs. The application is constructed from a number of smaller
microservices, some of which are developed in-house by the GitLab team and others
which are open source projects of their own. Examples of the latter include GitLab's
Postgres database and Nginx ingress proxy.
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Figure 3.3 presents a simplied view of the GitLab architecure. At the top of
the diagram are client interfaces for SSH and HTTP(S). These trac are routed to
GitLab shell and the Nginx ingress proxy respectively. From there, the request may be
passed to a number of services depending on the nature of the request. For example,
requests of dynamic GitLab content will be routed to the Unicorn web server, whereas
requests for static content will be handled by the GitLab Pages module.
For this study, we are concerned with vulnerabilities that manifest themselves
in a particular microservice and therefore may aect GitLab when deployed. Table 3.1
enumerates a subset of vulnerabilities aecting GitLab components from the last few
years.
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CVE-2019-11000 Group runner registration to-
ken disclosure
CVE-2019-7549 Unauthorized users can view
others' job info.










CVE-2019-10117 Open redirect issue
Gitaly RPC Server CVE-2019-11549 Info leak: HTTP/GIT cre-






CVE-2018-19572 Unauthorized access to les in
chroot environment
CVE-2019-6783 Directory traversal allowing
remote code execution
CVE-2019-5467 Persistent cross-site scripting
PostgreSQL Database
CVE-2017-7484 Data can be leaked from
privileged tables using client-
dened operator
CVE-2019-10130 Data can be leaked from priv-
ileged table rows using client-
dened operator
CVE-2019-10164 Buer overow when altering
user password
Nginx Ingress proxy CVE-2017-7529 Integer overow can leak
server memory.
Table 3.1: Some vulnerabilities aecting GitLab components
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N-versioning Postgres within GitLab
We previously showed that RDDR could be used to secure Postgres against
CVE-2017-7484, an information leak bug. In GitLab, we will again secure Postgres,
this time against a dierent info leak: CVE-2019-10130. We will apply RDDR to the
Postgres database microservice in a 3-instance conguration to mitigate this vulner-
ability.
1 −− Create leaky funct ion , and operator to c a l l i t
2 CREATE FUNCTION op_leak ( int , i n t ) RETURNS bool
3 AS 'BEGIN
4 RAISE NOTICE ' ' l eak %, %' ' , $1 , $2 ;
5 RETURN $1 < $2 ; END'
6 LANGUAGE p lpg sq l ;
7 CREATE OPERATOR <<< ( procedure=op_leak , l e f t a r g=int , r i gh t a r g=int
, r e s t r i c t=s c a l a r l t s e l ) ;
8 −− Will c a l l l eaky funct ion , p r i n t i n g rows to conso l e .
9 SELECT ∗ FROM some_table WHERE col_to_leak <<< 1000 ;
Listing 3.2: Exploit for CVE-2019-10130
CVE-2019-10130 is an information leak aecting Postgres 10.x up to 10.7. This
vulnerability allows a user-dened operator to leak privileged information from a table
enforcing per-row security policies. It is one of two recent vulnerabilities that arose
due to bugs in how Postgres enforces access control on statistics views [56,61]. For this
investigation, we assume there exists an SQL injection vulnerability in the frontend
of the application enabling an attacker to send arbitrary SQL queries to the backend
database and carry out the exploit. To be vulnerable, rst a privileged database
user must create a table with row-level security, and then grant SELECT privileges to
another database user, but deny access to one or more rows. The unprivileged user
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Figure 3.4: Modied GitLab architecture with Postgres replicated behind RDDR.
can then execute the exploit shown in Listing 3.2 to leak the protected rows. First,
they create a function which prints its arguments to the console. Then, they create
a custom operator to call this function. Finally, they execute a SELECT query that
invokes their custom operator. The SELECT query itself will not return the protected
rows, since access control is properly implemented for SELECT. However, the function
will still be passed the value of column `a' from every row in the table, and the
function can leak them out.
We compose our n-versioned Postgres deployment from three instances of Post-
gres, two at version 10.7 and a third at version 10.9. Version 10.7 exhibits this vul-
nerability, whereas 10.9 does not. When the exploit is carried out, RDDR will detect
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the dierence in behavior between 10.7 and 10.9 and abort the connection. Our mod-
ications to the GitLab architecture appear in Figure 3.4. The two 10.7 instances
form the lter pair and enable ltering of noise as described in Section 2.1.2. An
empty database is initialized with the schema for GitLab and instantiated in each
instance. GitLab is congured to use an external Postgres database and is pointed at
RDDR's incoming proxy, which forwards all queries to every Postgres instance. All
benign GitLab functions remain fully operational: users can log in, create projects,
view projects and more, and RDDR does not interfere. Only when a neighboring
container tries to carry out the exploit we described does RDDR jump into action,
closing the connection to the client before protected rows from the table are leaked.
This deployment emphasizes that RDDR can function well even in a complex
system with plenty of benign trac. Furthermore, it illustrates how RDDR can
be deployed around a specic service or services, rather than n-version the entire
application. This enables developers to n-version only the most critical services of
their application, thereby maximizing reliability while minimizing overhead.
3.1.6 Performance
TPC-H Benchmark Performance
To quantify the overhead incurred by n-versioning, we will compare the perfor-
mance of a single instance of a Postgres database to a 3-version deployment (where all
three Postgres instances are identical). We evaluate performance using the TPC-H
benchmark [62]. The TPC-H benchmark is widely used in industry for comparing
the performance of dierent databases. The benchmark species a database schema
and 22 queries to test with. We initialized each database instance with a TPC-H
database of scale 10x and 10GB of shared memory. We then executed all but one
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query against each of our two deployments with 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16 clients in parallel.
We skipped query 15 since it cannot be executed in parallel. For each combination of
query and concurrent clients, we measured the time to execute, memory usage, and
CPU usage of each deployment in order to quantify the overhead incurred for each.
We measure the memory and CPU usage of strictly the process tree that makes up
each deployment. All testing was done on an AWS virtual machine with 32 vCPUs
and 128 GB of memory.
Figure 3.5 shows the overhead incurred by using RDDR. The rst plot captures
execution time, the second CPU utilization, and the third memory utilization, all
normalized to the performance of the baseline single-instance deployment.
We expect the resource overhead of 3-versioning to be approximately 3×. We
observe that this largely holds true for memory consumption per the last plot of
Figure 3.5. We see a 3× overhead on CPU as well at just one client; the CPU
overhead actually reduces with more clients. We attribute this to increased server
load as more queries need to be serviced concurrently. This leads to more jobs running
in parallel which quickly saturates the available cores for both the single-instance and
3-version deployments.
Figure 3.6 shows the performance breakdown per query for 1 client and for
16 concurrent clients. Note that data for query 15 is missing, since this query was
excluded from testing. The complete set of performance plots can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
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Figure 3.5: Performance of RDDR normalized to the baseline for various dierent
numbers of concurrent clients. Boxes span the 5th through 95th percentile
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(a) 1 client (b) 16 clients
Figure 3.6: RDDR overhead normalized to baseline for 1 and 16 clients.
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Throughput and Latency
RDDR is deployed with three identical Postgres instances and evaluated us-
ing the pgbench benchmark. Its performance is compared to a baseline deployment
consisting of a single Postgres instance with and without an Envoy front proxy. We
hosted each deployment on an m5a.8xlarge AWS machine with 32 virtual CPUs and
128 GB of memory, which we will call the server machine. The pgbench benchmark
was executed from a separate m5a.4xlarge AWS machine with 16 virtual CPUs and
64 GB of memory, which we will call the client machine.
First, we baseline the quality of the connection between these two machines.
The server and client machines are co-located in the same AWS VPC, and they
communicate over the local network such that the number of network hops is one.
We evaluate the network connectivity between the two using netperf, proling the
throughput and latency of the connection. Table 3.2 collects our measurements. We




Median latency 0.973 milliseconds
90th pctl latency 1.064 milliseconds
99th pctl latency 1.179 milliseconds
Min latency 0.982 milliseconds
Max latency 2.388 milliseconds
Table 3.2: Baselining network connectivity between server and client machines.
Every deployment was initialized with a database of scale factor 100, or 10, 001, 100
table rows across all tables. We run pgbench for dierent numbers of simultaneous
clients, ranging from 1 to 256 in powers of two. Each client executes in a separate
thread and makes 10,000 SELECT transactions against each deployment. RDDR's
52
Figure 3.7: Throughput and latency for 10,000 transactions per client.
Figure 3.8: Throughput and latency for 10,000 transactions per client, normalized to
each baseline.
performance is compared to two dierent baseline deployments: a single instance of
Postgres with an Envoy front proxy, and a single instance without a front proxy.
Thus we can understand the penalty RDDR imposes and how that penalty compares
to the penalty of adding a front proxy. Figure 3.8 shows RDDR's throughput and
latency normalized to each baseline. At 8 clients, RDDR incurs a 10% reduction in
throughput and an 11% increase in latency compared to the single instance of Post-
gres behind Envoy. From there, the host machine begins to become overloaded, and
RDDR's relative performance drops.
In Figure 3.9, we quantify the relative CPU and memory usage of each de-
ployment serving 16 and 128 simultaneous clients. We see that at 16 clients, RDDR
exhibits roughly 3x memory and compute overhead, as expected for a 3 instance
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(a) 16 clients (b) 128 clients
Figure 3.9: Aggregate CPU and memory usage for each deployment with 16 and 128
clients.
deployment. As we increase to 128 clients, the compute resources of the server be-
come constrained; RDDR is held at near 100% utilization of CPU, while the other
deployments are not yet saturating.
We now study the contribution of RDDR's components to this slowdown.
Table 3.3 shows the seven dierent versions of RDDR that we will prole. The
rst three scenarios, A through C, represent RDDR deployed as a shadow proxy
replicating trac to 1, 2, and 3 dierent Postgres instances. In the next four scenarios,
D through G, we successively enable dierent features of RDDR on a deployment of
























Table 3.3: RDDR will be proled in each of the above scenarios to learn the contri-
bution of each component to performance. Only certain features will be enabled in
each scenario, indiciated by check mark.
Figure 3.10: Analyzing the performance of RDDR with successive components re-
moved. Each bar represents a dierent scenario enumerated in Table 3.3.
again executing 10,000 SELECT queries per client against the database. The test was
run for 8 through 128 simultaneous clients in powers of two. Results are shown in
Figure 3.10.
The measurements exhibit some noise, but the expected trend is visible: as
functionality is added to RDDR, penalties to throughput and latency are incurred.
Also, as one would expect, the deployments with fewer instances of Postgres scale
better beyond 8 simultaneous clients. This is because the CPU overhead to run 1
or 2 instances of Postgres and eld 8 simultaneous connection is lower than that
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of our typical 3 instance deployment. Scenario A represents the lightest workload
for RDDR, yet at 128 clients we still fall short of the single instance with Envoy by
29,000 transactions per second of throughput (-43%) and 3.172 milliseconds of latency
(+80%).
3.2 Discussion
In our evaluation we showcased ve dierent example deployments where
RDDR demonstrably improves robustness. We also explored the performance of
RDDR with two benchmarks. We ran the TPC-H benchmark and found the memory
and CPU overhead for one client to be in line with our expectationsabout a 3x
increase for a 3 instance deployment. With the pgbench benchmark, we were able to
prole the throughput and latency of RDDR as compared to a single instance of our
database with and without a front proxy. This revealed that, on our 32-core server,
RDDR's throughput began to lag behind our baselines at 16 simultaneous clients and
beyond. This is explained by the additional CPU usage incurred by running three re-
dundant instances of the database engine; simply put, RDDR exhausts the parallelism
of the server more quickly than our baselines. Ways to mitigate this issue include
upgrading to servers with more cores, or deploying each instance of the n-versioned
set on dierent machines. Though not explored in this paper, it's trivial to spread
an n-versioned deployment across multiple hosts with RDDR. Simply alter RDDR's
conguration le to point to remote hosts instead of localhost. We also observed that
RDDR acting as a simple proxy (Scenario A of our piecewise evaluation) fell short
of the performance of the Envoy proxy at a high volume of trac. This motivates





In this paper, we presented RDDR, a generic proxy service that enables n-
versioning microservices within a cloud application. We argued that n-versioning can
help x a number of common web app vulnerabilities and demonstrated as much via
practical deployments. We also measured the overhead inherent in our system and
found that we achieved the expected resource consumption for a 3-version deploy-
ment, with modest overhead when the parallelism of the host machine has not been
exhausted. In the following section, we present potential avenues for future work.
4.2 Future Work
4.2.1 Database Checkpointing
In this paper, we discussed a number of deployments where we n-versioned
databases. In these deployments, maintaining the consistency of data between the N
database instances can become a problem. If an attacker tries to drop tables from the
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database but is only successful for a strict subset of the N variants, RDDR needs to
be able to restore the aected variants back to a state consistent with the unaected
variants. We propose in future work to investigate combining RDDR with existing
methods of doing checkpoint-and-restore (such as [6366]) to maintain consistency of
data across the N variants.
4.2.2 Alternative Implementations
RDDR could potentially benet from being implemented as a plugin to existing
proxies such as Nginx or Envoy. As we explain in Section 3.1, RDDR's proxying
capabilities somewhat lag behind common proxies like Envoy. Were we to leverage
Envoy's proxy implementation, and add to it the ability to replicate and compare
trac, it's possible RDDR's performance could be improved. It would also be worth
exploring implementations in lower-level languages such as C, Rust, or Go.
4.2.3 Other Variation Mechanisms
Here we propose other ways of introducing diversity into n-versioned web ap-
plications that could be explored in future work.
Injecting Honey Pot Fields in a Database
While discussing how n-versioning could be applied to OWASP vulnerabilities,
we mentioned how honey pot elds could be added to database tables so that if an
attacker leaks that eld, RDDR will detect it. The application will never read that
eld in normal operation, so its appearance signies an SQL injection. We did not
get the opportunity to explore this strategy in this paper, but it would be interesting
to evaluate in future work. All of our evaluation thus far has focused on diversity
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derived from (i) dierent versions of the same codebase, (ii) dierent implementations
of the same specication, and (iii) the OS.
Using RDDR to do Permissions Checking
Many of the vulnerabilities aecting GitLab itself are access control related [67
70]. That is, the app simply does incorrect permission checking before sending along
some resource. This is subtly dierent from an information disclosure like leaking
stack data, since the data that is leaked is intended for an end-user, just not this
particular recipient. Therefore, we can't simply vary the data itself, since in most
cases that data will need to be sent out to the client and should not trigger RDDR.
We must nd some way to leverage n-versioning to do permissions checking.
Here we propose one strategy that is potentially more straightforward than peppering
the codebase with permissions checks. Let's suppose the developer is implementing
an API which returns a JSON object. He or she can simply add a eld to the
JSON dictionary which diverges across the instances when the user does not have





I = f(prequired − puser)× IDinst
where IDinst is the ID of this instance of the application, puser and prequired
are the permission level of the user and that required by the system for this feature
respectively encoded as integers, and I is the integer which will diverge only when
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the user has insucient permissions. Note that only when the user has insucient
permissions, that is puser < prequired, is I non-zero. I can be rewritten as follows:
I(puser, prequired) =

0 puser ≥ prequired
IDinst otherwise
If the instance ID appears in the JSON returned, the responses diverge and
RDDR catches the leak. This technique could be more rigorously evaluated in future
work.
Integration Into the Service Mesh Data Plane
In this paper, we targeted a microservice architecture such as the one used by
GitLab which does not feature a service mesh like Istio [71]. A service mesh adds
infrastructure to the standard microservice deployment, creating more indirection
and abstracting the deployment logic from developers' application logic. Part of this
infrastructure is the data plane, which consists of proxies deployed as sidecar con-
tainers for every microservice in the application. These sidecar proxies abstract away
the deployment topology. Each microservice now communicates with other logical
microservices rather than concrete instances. RDDR could be a useful addition to
the service mesh data plane. Microservices can be n-versioned together within a pod
with RDDR deployed alongside as a sidecar. This helps to hide the fact that the mi-
croservice is n-versionedan unnecessary detail from the point of view of the other
microservices in the deployment.
60




Figures A.1 to A.5 show the performance of RDDR on the TPC-H benchmark
compared to a baseline single instance for increasing numbers of clients. Performance
is measured in terms of time to execute each query, the maximum system memory
in use while executing the query, and the maximum CPU in use while executing the
query.
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Figure A.1: RDDR performance
compared to baseline for 1 client.
Figure A.2: RDDR performance
compared to baseline for 2 clients.
Figure A.3: RDDR performance
compared to baseline for 4 clients.
Figure A.4: RDDR performance
compared to baseline for 8 clients.
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Figure A.5: RDDR performance




Source Code and Documentation
This project is open source under the MIT License. The project homepage is
hosted at:
https://rddr.readthedocs.io/
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